Ordo Amoris: Putting the American People First

"Ordo Amoris" explains the theology of putting our fellow Americans first.

Sebastian Pestritto holds a B.A. in politics and theatre from Hillsdale College. He currently works for the Intercollegiate Studies Institute in Wilmington, Delaware.

Vice President JD Vance recently caused something of a firestorm on “X” when he appealed to longstanding Catholic teaching to support President Trump’s border policy. The claim sparked outrage among many liberals — Catholic and otherwise — who decried the statement as unchristian. The truth of the matter is that Vance’s claim is found in St. Augustine, articulated in depth by St. Thomas Aquinas, and firmly rooted in Sacred Scripture.

For context, Vance conducted a media interview where he criticized figures on the American left for seeming to have more compassion for illegal aliens than for their fellow citizens. Vance was then accused of contradicting Scripture, specifically John 15:12-13, in which Our Lord says, “Love one another as I have loved you. Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” In response, Vance posted a reply encouraging his critics to “just google ‘Ordo Amoris,’” which translates to “Order of Love.”

The doctrine of Ordo Amoris undergirds the Catholic understanding of national sovereignty and immigration. It is the purpose of this article to explain the theological principles that support American border policy (the policy-side of which my colleague, Tom Sarrouf, has written on in these same pages).

The doctrine Vance alluded to is found in Augustine, but is built-out and articulated fully by Aquinas, in whose writings we find the framework for this issue and the answers to two of the most common objections. Vance is referring to Augustine’s statement In The City of God, where he writes, “We must, in fact, observe the right order even in our love for the very love with which we love what is deserving of love.” (XV, 24).

Augustine is articulating his belief that, “a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered love’” (Ibid). From this passage alone we can dismiss the notion that Vance’s statement contradicts John 15. Our Lord commands us to love one another “as I have loved you.” If we are to imitate Christ, who is perfection itself, we must have order in our love. The question that remains is what constitutes rightly ordered love, and how that order applies to politics.

Aquinas addresses this issue in his treatment of charity. In writing on the application of charity to others he explains:

This very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected to us (IIa IIae, 26.7 Resp).

This statement can be a bit overwhelming when taken without context, so we need to break it down. Aquinas backs up Augustine’s point by demonstrating that there must be order in charity. If there is a principle, there must be an order. The order of charity “is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.” (26.1, Resp). Aquinas clarifies the point further in explaining why God must be loved more than our neighbor.

God is loved “as the cause of happiness.” He is the first principle from which it flows. Our neighbor, on the other hand, is loved “as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him” (26.2, Resp). Put simply, God, is the object of charity because He is the first principle on which it is founded. This fact is why man must love himself more than his neighbor. Since we partake directly with God, our love of God through another person is not as unitive as our love of God in ourselves.

This reality is anchored in Scripture. Taking the example used against Vance (John 15:12-13), we can see how it is a greater love of God in oneself for a man to “lay down his life for his friends.” In doing so, a man loves himself more because the act “pertains to the perfection of virtue” (26.4 Ad 2). Keep in mind what we have learned from Augustine on ordered love as the life of virtue. It is only logical that man must love God in himself in a more unitive way than he loves God in others.

Aquinas demonstrates this principle by pointing out that man must not engage in the evil of sin, “not even that he may free his neighbor from sin” (Ibid, Resp). Our Lord demonstrates the application of this principle in the parable of the ten virgins. (Matt. 25:1-13.) Incidentally, this principle is also rooted in Matthew 22:39, which is sometimes clumsily used to argue against it. We are commanded to “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” It is clear from Our Lords words that love of oneself is the model for love of others, and it is self-evident that “the model exceeds the copy” (26.4, s.c.).

All of this builds up to the order of love with regard to our fellow men. Should we love some of our fellow man more closely than others? In answering this question, Aquinas makes a distinction and thereby answers an objection that has been thrown at Vance’s statement. This objection uses another instance of Augustine talking about love:

All men are to be loved equally; but since you cannot be of assistance to everyone, those especially are to be cared for who are most closely bound to you by place, time, and opportunity, as if by chance (De Doctrina Christiana, 1.28).

This statement is entirely consistent with what Aquinas writes on the order of love. In fact, by using this statement to show the distinction Aquinas makes in the application of love to others, we can easily demonstrate the application of this principle to politics.

This distinction is made in answering the question of loving all men — as Augustine states above. Aquinas points out that we love all men equally “because we wish them all one same generic good, namely, everlasting happiness” (26.6 Ad 1). In this respect, we have equal love for all men. However, in addressing the order of love for people of different relations to us, Aquinas is clear that we do not love all men the same in every respect.

The reason for this inequality of love is simple: We have more modes of love for those who are more closely connected to us. We have a greater love for (and in the same way a greater obligation to) our family relations than for strangers. In addition to the universal charity we owe to mankind, “friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin” (26.8, Resp). This relation is something “affecting the very substance,” which makes it “prior to and more stable than all others” (Ibid).

This principle follows naturally from what has been explained above regarding man’s love of God in himself as more unitive than his love of God through another. The same principle applies proportionally to those in varying degrees of relation to us. We have a greater love for our fellow citizens because our connection with them is closer and more permanent. Having built out the framework for this point, we can now apply it to Vance’s position and find that he is entirely consistent with Church teaching. Aquinas makes the order of love very clear in its application to strangers:

Out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected (26.7, Resp).

The passage follows naturally in applying what Aquinas writes regarding love of God and love of self to our love of others. It is also consistent with the virtue of justice, which is to render to God and others what they are due. To owe a greater love to a stranger than to one’s family is impossible because it would be unjust. In the same way, it would be unjust to bear a greater love for strangers than for one’s fellow citizens. The virtues cannot be abstracted from one another. You cannot be charitable while being unjust.

It remains to answer the second main objection to Vance’s statement and by doing so to dismiss the notion that having greater love for one’s family and countrymen means that one must hate or despise the stranger, or the equally absurd idea that Catholics are not obligated to have charity and compassion for all men, no matter the relation we may have to them.

Vance’s statement has been attacked on the grounds of Luke 10:29-37, which is the story of the Good Samaritan. In the parable, a man is set upon by robbers and left for dead. It is not the Priest or the Levite, but the Samaritan who helps the man in need. The Church Fathers offer clear direction for how we are to read the words of Our Lord in this parable. Foremost, we are to understand the Samaritan is Christ Himself. In his commentary on the passage, St. Augustine writes that the Samaritan is he “in whom our Lord Jesus Christ would have Himself typified” (Catena Aurea, Lk. 10:33).

St. Ambrose and other commentators confirm this fact in their writings. Our Lord concludes the parable by telling us to “go, and do thou likewise.” We are being called to nothing less than the imitation of Christ in treatment of our neighbor. While the rendering of physical assistance is certainly present in the parable, the reality of what is happening runs far deeper. We are called to imitate Christ in what he does for us. That is, the salvation of souls. Remember, we are obligated to have charity for all men in our desire for their salvation. Christ shows us how to live out that charity through imitation of Him.

The Fathers demonstrate how we imitate the Good Samaritan in working for the salvation of souls. St. Augustine writes, “the binding up of wounds is the checking of sins;” St. Ambrose writes, “As by wine he pricks to the heart by the denunciation of judgement;” St. Gregory writes, “By wine let the corrupt parts be washed, by oil let the healing parts be assuaged” (CA, Lk. 34).

The message is clear: we are called to so much more than mere physical assistance, we are called to the salvation of souls. We owe this charity to everyone. To reduce this charity to merely “being nice” would be a grave offense to God. It is not that we neglect physical kindness, but that our Faith gives us a far deeper and more meaningful understanding of what it means to have compassion for our fellow men.

In commenting on this parable, St. Gregory offers guidance for those in positions of authority: “We must then mix gentleness with severity, and we must so combine the two, that those who are put under us be neither exasperated by our excessive harshness, nor be relaxed by too much kindness” (CA, Lk. 34). Authority thus exercised is consistent with charity and justice. We should pray that all leaders be given the grace to live out the words of St. Gregory in pursuit of their duties.

True charity, compassion, and brotherly love encompass so much more than the common notion of love that has been used to attack Vance’s statement. The ordering of this Christian love, as demonstrated by Aquinas and the words of Sacred Scripture, cannot contradict justice nor itself. We live out the Gospel when we strive to fulfill our obligations of closely bonded love with our families and our duties of fraternal charity to our fellow citizens and nation first.

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