Feminism and the End of History
Fukuyama's "end of history" explains the fertility crisis better than the "ascendence" of liberal democracy.
Thirty-two years ago, Francis Fukuyama declared that liberalism constituted the “end of history” for all human societies. He stated this claim in light of liberal democracy’s “ascendence” as the ultimate form of political regime. He appears to have been literally prescient, however. Fukuyama's "end of history" explains the fertility crisis better than the "ascendence" of liberal democracy.
In 2023, the CDC reported that the American fertility rate had dropped to its lowest figure in recorded history, at just 1.62 births per woman. In Europe, this figure sits at a steadily declining 1.46. In South Korea, it has reached nearly apocalyptic levels — just 0.72 births per woman. There, fertility is so below the replacement level that experts predict its population will be cut in half by the end of the century.
Based on these trends, it is not hyperbole to state that developed societies are staring down the barrel of a civilizational crisis that threatens to cause significant social upheaval at best and full-scale extinction at worst. Much ink has been spilled trying to explain the makings of our impending demographic disaster. Left-liberals, to the extent that they afford the issue attention, tend to attribute falling fertility rates to the ills of capitalism and the pressures of the modern economy. Meanwhile, right-liberals prefer to fault a decline in religiosity and “family values” as the primary culprit.
Though both explanations are true in a certain sense, neither captures the full picture. In reality, the collapse in the birth rate must be understood as a culmination of both social and economic factors. First, the technological changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution that separated work from the home. Second, postwar American society’s embrace of feminism, creating a modern workplace hostile to family and prioritizing autonomy over all.
A lasting solution to the fertility crisis must take a holistic approach — challenging modern feminism while simultaneously structuring the economy to accommodate both motherhood and women's professional aspirations.
To understand the roots of the demographic challenges of industrialized nations, it is first necessary to examine the station of women in the pre-industrial era. Contrary to popular belief in some circles, women constituted a significant portion of the workforce at this time. In her book Feminism Against Progress, the English author Mary Harrington notes that it was “normal for all women save the uppermost aristocracy to work [in England],” with women especially important in tasks such as “subsistence agriculture,” “cottage industry,” or the production of “food and craft items for sale.”
Importantly, Harrington emphasizes that all of these jobs were performed within the home, and that “children were expected to pitch in with work as soon as they were old enough.” This point highlights both the lack of tension between the domestic and professional spheres during this period and discusses how a larger family could even serve as an asset to a household’s finances. Given these conditions, it is unsurprising that in 1800, the American birthrate stood at 7.1 and those in Europe ranged from around 4.5 to 6.2 children per woman.
The Industrial Revolution upended this dynamic. The introduction of new technologies such as the sewing machine and assembly line shifted most productive work away from the home, drastically increasing productivity but bringing with it major social upheaval. The population of cities began to boom, a distinct working class came into formation, and the relationship between domestic and professional life grew strained. This is not to say the Industrial Revolution was “wrong,” it was not, but it in-part contributed to these changes.
In his book Gender, the Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich, a critic of the Industrial Revolution, writes that the economic system transformed into “into scarcity-based exchanges or tasks of production meted out as the exchange of labor for pay,” that saw little practical differentiation between men and women.
Illich goes so far as to argue that these changes turned the sexes into “neutered economic agents, stripped of any quality other than the functions of consumer and worker.” Indeed, the share of women working outside the home increased steadily during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and exploded during the onset of World War I. Though these numbers ticked down as men came home from the war, it became clear at this point that the nature of modern work — and its relationship to domestic life — had changed permanently.
The Industrial Revolution posed an existential challenge to traditional gender roles, and the modern feminist movement emerged as a response to this upheaval. At the turn of the 20th century, three competing models for how to manage women’s entry into the industrial workforce began to emerge.
The first was a resistance to this idea entirely. This notion, which was the most dominant at the time, was one that posited that women simply were not suited for the pressures of the modern professional sphere and should instead focus more on domestic life.
The second was one that advocated for the inclusion of women in the workplace, articulated by reformers such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, but with reforms to balance motherhood with professional ambitions.
The third was that of radical feminism. This theory, which became especially prominent during the sexual revolution, argued that women could only be free to pursue a professional career if they were liberated from the ability to bear children.
Though the “separate spheres” and reform models of female participation were both briefly popularized, with the former especially prominent in the aftermath of World War II, it was the radical feminist vision of the sexes that ultimately won out. The FDA approved the first reliable oral birth control pill in 1960, and soon after, contraception, no-fault divorce, and abortion were legalized nationwide.
This background story gets us to where our society is today. By promoting abortion and birth control as means to “liberate” women from their biology, the feminist movement has helped shape a modern economy centered on the childless male as the default worker model. Pregnancy — and femininity more broadly — has become an inconvenience to be dealt with rather than a gift to be cherished and accommodated.
Under this paradigm, more women have entered the workforce, but often with minimal support from their employers. For instance, in 2022, only 35% of American corporations provided paid maternity leave, a number that has declined since the COVID-19 pandemic.
Additionally, women who wish to stay at home to take care of their children often no longer have this option, as the transition of the economy to the full-time two worker model has made participation in the workforce a necessity for most American women. Consequently, the birth rate, once healthily above replacement, began dropping in 1957 and has more than halved since then.
In a certain sense, second wave feminism has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It began with the premise that women could not simultaneously be mothers and active participants in the economy. By shaping a modern workplace that views female biology as a deviation, feminists have made this a reality.
his development has been disastrous both for almost all parties involved. For women, it has set her capacity for motherhood in conflict with her ambition for a career, leaving her ultimately unfulfilled in one aspect or the other. For men, this dynamic has contributed to a decline in the marriage rate and the onset of the loneliness crisis. For society at large, the feminist reinterpretation of the economic system has put industrialized nations on the precipice of a destructive demographic squeeze.
To address this looming crisis, various thinkers have explored solutions, though their approaches differ significantly. Some philosophers across the political spectrum have increasingly advocated for reactionary measures. In certain leftist circles, this is manifested in proposals similar to that of Ivan Illich, which is to attempt to return to a pre-industrial society with a subsistence economy. Meanwhile, on the traditionalist right, many long for a return to the “separate spheres” model of gender roles prevalent throughout the 1950s.
However, neither solution is tenable. The former ignores the benefits of technological progress. This latter approach overlooks the legitimate concerns many women have about being entirely financially dependent on their husbands and the fact that it is impossible to reshape society’s customs, for better or worse, entirely.
Instead of looking backward to impractical solutions, the path forward requires rethinking the economic system to align with the needs of family life in the modern world. The economic system ought not to suppress the sexual differences between men and women, but embrace them, accommodating the unique needs of women who decide to work while also allowing mothers to stay home with their children if they so choose. Fundamentally, this will require prioritizing family life over mere efficiency as the foundation of our economic system. Government policy has a significant role to play in this regard.
The Industrial Revolution provided the catalyst for liberalism — and by extension feminism – to transform the economy into one whose highest good was individual autonomy and efficiency. The rejection of anything permanent, anything sacrificial, that could impede on this dynamic has created a society in which children are a burden and family life is an afterthought.
None of this, however, was inevitable — nor is it irreparable. Developed societies have the opportunity, and indeed the imperative, to chart a new philosophical path for the future. This new vision must strive to prioritize the family as the cornerstone of a healthy and flourishing society. It must recognize that true prosperity is measured not merely by material output but by the strength of familial bonds and the moral formation of future generations.
America must reject the pathologies of feminism that pit man against woman and woman against her own nature. Only through this philosophical realignment can developed societies recover the enduring goods of sacrifice, permanence, and generational continuity. In doing so, they can prove that history is not yet over, but rather poised for a renewal grounded in the timeless truths of human flourishing.
Editor’s Note (Jan. 22, 2025): Shri Thakur and Tom Sarrouf were recently awarded The American Postliberal’s inaugural “Vox Populi Award" for their exemplary writing and contributions to the magazine.
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Harrington, Mary. Feminism Against Progress. Regnery Publishing, 2023.
“Fertility and Mortality in the United States.” Eh.net, 2024, eh.net/encyclopedia/fertility-and-mortality-in-the-united-states/.
Illich, Ivan. Gender. Pantheon Books, 1982
“Maternity Leave Coverage.” Guardianlife.com, 2022, www.guardianlife.com/absence-management/fmla/maternity-leave.
“South Korea’s Plan to Avoid Population Collapse.” Council on Foreign Relations, 5 Sept. 2024, www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/south-koreas-plan-avoid-population-collapse.
“U.S. Fertility Rate Drops to Another Historic Low.” CDC.gov, 24 Apr. 2024, www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2024/20240525.htm.
Walker, Shaun. “‘Baby Machines’: Eastern Europe’s Answer to Depopulation.” The Guardian, The Guardian, 4 Mar. 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/baby-bonuses-fit-the-nationalist-agenda- but-do-they-work.
I attended a small book signing with author Rob Henderson last year. Rob is kind of a less-right-wing JD Vance, similar life trajectory (foster care, Marines, Yale) and now writes on social psychology. One of the attendees asked Rob about birthrates. His answer was extremely interesting. He was kind of thinking aloud (paraphrasing):
"What if we don't have an instinct to have children?" [we all laughed] "No, no, hear me out. We have an instinct to have sex (especially men)." [we laughed again] "We've known for millennia that sex produces babies. And when that happens, we have an instinct to take care of babies (especially women). For nearly all of human history, these 2 instincts were sufficient to ensure reproduction of the species. Then we invented The Pill. Reliable, pharmacological birth control forces us to choose whether to have kids. And it turns out, we don't appear to have an instinct to reproduce. We may be the only species on the planet that doesn't."
Rob is onto something very big here, and it ties into exactly what you're saying in this piece.
I am a say-at-home father of 3 late teenage girls. I am a feminist in the sense that I want them to have every opportunity available to them that they would have if they were boys. But mostly I want them to have lives of meaning and goodness. What if modern feminism is antithetical to that? What if laws that encourage my daughters (and everyone else's) to compete with men render them spiritually impoverished and familially barren as individuals and produce a society that no longer sustains itself? I don't have answers for this, but increasingly, I fear that modern feminism is a collective suicide pact, a deathwork as Phillip Rieff would say. I don't want my daughters growing old in a deathwork culture.
It's true that the return of a stable peasantry is neither likely nor desirable, but I do think we need to look at a fundamental issue that the English "distributists" of the early 20th C. had a better handle on: sufficient ownership of productive property. They were drawing directly upon early Catholic social teaching, and advocated not only "back to the land" solutions but also using technology to increase the possibility of individual ownership rather than decrease it. That's the problem with modern industrial economies today: "efficiency" (rightly criticized in this article) demands the continuous removal of the human being from labor, which likewise means not owning the means of production as well. The result is a bias towards centralization, consolidation, and automation. That's the fundamental problem. Are we surprised, then, when various firms seem "too big to fail," as in the late 2000s? We're headed that way again. Unregulated high-tech, big capitalism inevitably results in fragility, both for individuals and for whole societies. And nobody wants to have kids when they constantly feel economically insecure.